The petitioner, 13-year-old Gianinna Gallardo was riding along in her school bus, minding her own fucking business. When she got off the bus, a truck driver ran over her, causing serious injury, putting Gallardo in a coma. She remains in a vegetative state.
Since she is highly incapacitated, her suit is being managed by her parents and family members on her behalf, as she’s in no condition to go to SCOTUS, as cool as that might be.
As you can imagine, Gallardo’s family sued, and were eventually awarded $800,00 to cover past and future expenses. Pay attention to the “past and future” part of that, it’ll be rather important to the case.
Medicaid paid over $862k for the medical expenses she had incurred so far. When Medicaid was originally enacted, it had no provisions to recover money it had paid for healthcare costs. Once your bills were paid, they were paid.
But, in the sixties, one exception was written in that if the person whose bills were paid wins a lawsuit related to those expenses against a third party who caused the injuries, in this case the truck driver’s employer, Medicaid can claim a basic double-dip situation, and ask for their money back, since the 3rd party is now paying instead.
Since she won $800k from the driver, Medicaid was like, “Yo, we’d like our money back, please. We’ve got bills to pay, dawg.”
As per usual, SCOTUS loves these nerdy fucking weird-ass cases, where the interesting part of the case is basically settled, but there’s some weird fucking procedural question which is ambiguous, that they think needs clarified. This is yet another one of those cases.
So in this case, the issue is that the lawsuit was for “past and future” medical expenses. But the petitioner (Gallardo, the victim) argues Medicaid is only allowed to take back money paid for past expenses, which in this case, was apparently about $35,000. Team Gallardo is saying, “Whoa, Medicaid, you don’t get all of that. A lot of it is for future expenses, and you don’t get to take any of that.”
So that’s literally all that SCOTUS gets to decide. Do they divide up the $800k based on what was awarded for past and future expenses, and only let Medicaid recover the award for the past expenses portion, or do they let Medicaid take all of it until they’re made whole. Since only about $35k of their settlement was for past expenses, Medicaid sees that $765k nugget hanging out there, and they don’t want to let that shit go.
It’s also worth nothing, that this poor kid will assuredly rack up more expenses than what Medicaid or the lawsuit has gotten her, so the idea she’s being unjustly enriched somehow, is falser than false.
Counsel Brian Gowdy for Gallardo, early on, responding to Justice Thomas’ line of questioning about what costs are recoverable by Medicaid, and are they similar to child support said this:
Well, Your Honor, the analysis would still be the same whether it’s child support or tort recovery. The analysis would be—the medical care—and I said yes when you said it’s very broad, but the medical care mentioned in the assignment clause, in our view, when read in the whole text, is shorthand for medical care covered by Medicaid, furnished by Medicaid, paid for by Medicaid, and, therefore, the analysis will be whether the third-party liability covers the same care, service, or item covered by Medicaid. And my point about distinguishing between tort recoveries and childcare is tort recovery often pays for items, care, and service not covered by Medicaid.
Brian Gowdy
For example, if you’re a disabled person, you will need a special vehicle with medical equipment to be transported to your appointments. Medicaid does not cover for that, but a tortfeasor may have to pay for that. Childcare, I think, is different in the other regard in that childcare requires the parent to pay for all medical care, whether it’s covered by Medicaid or not, and, therefore, I think it’ll operate differently in that context than in the tort recovery context.
He’s basically like, “how the fuck can Medicaid take money paid for things that Medicaid never covered, or will cover in the future? That’s not fucking fair. If she only won what Medicare paid for, which is about 35 Gs in this case, by all means, take the 35 Gs back, but these greedy motherfuckers are taking everything from this poor kid. You can’t be fucking seriously even considering this right now.”
Spoiler alert: they were.
An amici for the petitioner (Gallardo) was the federal government. They agree with Gallardo. I know this is confusing, because the Medicaid law is a federal law, but apparently, each state has their own Medicaid program, with its own money, that I’m guessing operates under the federal Medicaid law? I don’t fucking know. And I still don’t after listening to this shit. I also don’t know if Medicaid, after getting all this money, will end up paying back in the future for future expenses. But anyway, it’s Florida trying to get that money back, not the federal government who wrote the law.
Counsel Vivek Suri for the federal government gets the award for the most prepared lawyer SCOTUS has ever had walk through the door. After petitioner’s counsel Gowdy was done with his argument, Vivek came in, and literally answered pretty much every fucking question every justice asked to Gowdy, as coolly and calmly as I’ve ever heard one argue. He deserves the Rico Suave award, if one exists. Here’s his opening remarks:
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Our position does not turn on any distinction between past and future medical expenses.
Couldn’t find a single usable image of Solicitor General Vivek Suri on Google. I saw some that might be him, but it was hard to be sure. This guy’s a fucking ghost. So here’s an image of Rico Suave instead
It instead turns on who paid for those expenses. Medicaid is entitled to the portions of the recovery that correspond to the things Medicaid paid for, and the beneficiary gets the portions of the recovery that correspond to the things the beneficiary paid for. Justice Thomas, you asked about how this would work in the context of child support or medical support provided by a parent.
Our answer is that it would work the same way.
The same kind of allocation would have to be made. Justice Alito, you asked how this would work in the context of payments that are made after the settlement.
I agree that’s something that can happen, although it’s unusual, and in that case, as I’ve said, we draw no distinction between past and future payments.
The entitlement would turn entirely on who made the payment. Justice Kagan, you asked about the word “available” in (A).
And we agree that the word “available” can be read to mean theoretically available.
But the key language here is not in (A).
It’s in (B).
(B) is the provision that specifies the pool of funds from which the recovery can be obtained.
And that’s at the very end of (B) where it says “to the extent of such legal liability.” But, if you look earlier in (B), it says such a legal liability is found to exist after medical assistance has been made available on behalf of the individual.
And that makes clear that we’re not talking about theoretical availability.
We’re talking about actually being made available. In addition, if you look at page 7A of our brief, there’s a regulation, 42 C.F.R. 433.138, which interprets (A) itself to apply to services that are furnished and not merely available under the plan. Justice Kavanaugh, you asked about the Medicare analogy, and I don’t think that analogy really helps in this context.
That’s because Medicare adopts the system that was rejected in Ahlborn.
In other words, it’s not the case that Medicare takes the pool of money that is attributable to future medical expenses.
Rather, it takes from the entire pool of the settlement. And now — we think it’s rational for Congress to have done one of two things.
You could say you limit the — the government to the pool of money that corresponds to the funds that have actually been paid for by Medicaid, and that would be fair to the beneficiary. Alternatively, you could say that the government could take the entire settlement. That would be less fair to the beneficiary, but it avoids the administrative costs and hassle of having these allocation determinations. But what’s less understandable is why Congress would have adopted the middle ground that Florida wants, where you have the administrative expense of these allocation proceedings, but you also don’t have the fairness to the beneficiary because Medicaid is going beyond the pool that corresponds to the funds that Medicaid itself has paid for.
In many ways, it’s the worst of all worlds. Justice Gorsuch, you had asked about Section 1983 and how that would apply here. The federal government agrees that the Court shouldn’t reach that issue in this case.
Justice Neil Gorsuch
It’s a difficult issue about how Section 1983 should be interpreted.
There are also complications about whether it should be under Section 1983 or Ex parte Young.
We’d urge the Court to reserve that case — that issue for future cases. Justice Breyer, your hypothetical involved Smith and Jones and Smith getting to pay I think it was 15,000 out of the 25,000. How does Medicaid recover the remaining 10,000? I think the way to deal with that is, first, the state could go after the tortfeasor directly.
It has multiple avenues for doing that.
It’s received an assignment.
It could use that assignment to bring the suit in the first place. Second, after the suit has been brought by the private individual, the state could intervene in that case. Third, after the settlement has been reached, the state could say we’re not a party to that settlement and we still want to sue the individual for the remaining money, and in that suit, the state could ask for the full extent of its expenses. But what the state is doing here is it’s not going after the tortfeasor.
It’s going after the victim of the accident, and it’s seeking funds that don’t correspond to the things it paid for. We think that’s exactly what the anti-lien clause prevents the state from doing. If there are any other questions, I welcome them.
Clearly, Vivek was ready for this shit.
Once the petitioner and the federal government were done with their arguments, it was time for the greedy fucks from Florida to chime in. Henry Whitaker for the respondents (Florida) made it clear that basically, the program is hemorrhaging money, and so they can’t be fucking around, leaving money out there on the table:
Henry Whitaker
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Medicaid is an important and expensive part of the social safety net.
To help keep Medicaid solvent, Congress made Medicaid the payer of last resort, meaning that other available resources should pay medical expenses before Medicaid pays.
As part of that role, Medicaid recovers money from tortfeasors who injure Medicaid beneficiaries.
When it does so, Medicaid can never be reimbursed for more than it paid out in benefits. The question here is whether the program may seek that reimbursement from a tort settlement, not only out of medical damages or medical expenses paid in the past but also for medical expenses that will be paid in the future. Section 1396k of the statute answers that question.
It provides for Medicaid beneficiaries to assign to the program rights to payment for “medical care,” not past medical care, not some complicated subset of medical care.
Medical care, period, including payments for medical care that may be necessary in the future. That reading is confirmed by subsection (B) of Section 1396k, the remainder provision.
Medical expenses may include expenses that Medicaid paid and expenses that the beneficiary paid.
The remainder provision says that if Medicaid recovers all of those medical expenses, Medicaid is reimbursed for its expenses and the remaining amount goes to the beneficiary. But, if there isn’t enough money to reimburse both Medicaid and the beneficiary, the remainder provision says that Medicaid gets paid first.
In other words, far from prohibiting Medicaid from recovering out of all medical damages, Section 1396k gives Medicaid’s reimbursement claim priority over other claims to medical expenses. The result is neither untoward nor surprising.
Medicaid can never be reimbursed for more than it paid out in benefits. Medicaid can also never receive any non-medical damages, but because it is the payer of last resort for medical expenses, it may recover from all medical damages. I welcome the Court’s questions.
~Counsel for Florida Henry Whitaker
He made an interesting point in saying that Medicaid is not a payer of first resort, it’s the last. So if there’s anyone who’s paying for medical care for the victim, then that pay must happen first, and then once that’s exhausted, then we’ll talk about Medicaid kicking in. Since in this case, Medicaid paid first, before the tort was settled, if the Gallardo’s had won the suit first, Medicaid would never have kicked in a dime yet, since they haven’t exhausted all the money from the tort. So what they’re asking for here, is no different. It’s just a timeline issue.
In a 7:2 majority, where justice Elena Kagan joined the Republican appointees, they ruled that in order for Medicaid to remain solvent, it has the right to recover any money’s from a lawsuit the claimant recovered as a result of the lawsuit relating to their injuries until Medicaid is made whole for the money they paid out.
Whether or not those damages were to pay for things Medicaid covered or not, is irrelevant. They don’t give a fuck if this leaves the patient without enough funds to cover their medical bills into the future, the law is the law. If congress doesn’t like it, congress should change it.
Justices Sotomayor and Breyer think the other seven are being the world’s biggest assholes right meow. Basically accusing the other seven of not reading the entirety of the statutes around this in context, but instead, focusing on particular segments of the law in isolation, and coming to a conclusion they might not otherwise come to.
While OSHA was trying to make a sweeping rule for all workplaces in the other case, the department of Health and Human Services (HHS) here narrowly regulated that anyone who works in a facility that accepts Medicare or Medicaid (we’ll call it Eminem for fun) be vaccinated, unless they have a religious or medical exemption. Failing to do so, would cause a loss of funding from Eminem for being non-compliant.
So to be clear, it wasn’t a law forcing anyone to do anything, it was government saying that if any hospital wants paid by Eminem, it must comply with government’s rules. They were welcome to no longer accept Eminem, and not be subject to this rule.
Aside from the money issue, the elderly who were most at risk, are the people using Eminem, making it additionally important for them.
Also unlike the OSHA case, healthcare workers did not have the option to wear a mask if they chose not to vaccinate.
On a side note, if you’re curious, it’s called Biden v. Missouri because HHS operates at the behest of president Biden, and Missouri is the state that decided HHS had gone too fucking far with this shit.
I’ll go on my soapbox for a second and simply say, if someone has a degree in healthcare, and they’re still anti-vaccine, I’m going to argue that the notion that they slept, drank, or got high most of their way through college, is significantly more likely. The days of a rogue scientist being right against an overwhelming consensus of other scientists pretty much ended with the modern scientific method.
I should be clear, while I have a pretty low tolerance for healthcare workers who are anti-vaccine as a whole, I’m only referring to those who are against vaccines altogether. There are legitimate science-based reasons for a small subset of people not to get vaccinated, so I’m totally not attacking them, nor arguing they must be wrong. Those are the “medical exemption” people mentioned above.
During arguments, Justice Sotomayor apparently opted to “tag in” for the Biden administration, adding her own supporting argument that this is a power within Constitution’s spending clause, as it allows the government to impose conditions it desires, when it offers to give money to an entity.
Justice Sonya Sotomayor
Justice Kagan, also seemingly argued for petitioner’s. When counsel for Missouri argued that people might be put in a position to quit if they were opposed to the vaccine, causing a healthcare worker shortage, Kagan fired back that it’s also true that workers who already left the workplace for fear of contracting COVID might return to work if they know all their idiot antivax coworkers were fired, or sucked it up and took the fucking vaccine.
She also pointed out many people were avoiding going to the hospital for fear of contracting COVID, in part because there are idiots at the hospital who refused the fucking vaccine for their own dumb fucking reasons, instead of science-based ones.
I’m also putting religion into a dumb fucking reason, because I’ve never seen the word “vaccine” in the Bible, Quran, or any other religious book, except maybe Dianetics, but that’s not a religion, it’s a cult. So any religious exemption to vaccines is the imagination of the believer, not the word of their god as handed down by any text that I’m aware of.
Justice Gorsuch, while grasping the idea that this is a spending clause, still raised concerns this statute is still essentially telling hospitals who to fire, affecting tenure and such (which HHS is prohibited from doing), because it’s…well…I’ll let Justice Gorsuch explain in his own words:
This statute, unlike the OSHA statute, actually contains an express limitation on the Secretary’s authority that we haven’t yet discussed and that I know you’re familiar with.
Among other things, it says the Secretary shall not control the tenure of employees at covered healthcare facilities or their compensation or their selection. And this regulation, arguably, the other side will say—I’m sure we’re going to hear it, so I didn’t want you to not have a chance—is going to say this effectively controls the employment of individuals at these healthcare facilities in a way that Congress specifically prohibited. As I understand your response, it is we’re just providing money or not providing money, and by withholding money, we’re not controlling who you hire. And I might understand that in some circumstances, but in a statute where everything is about spending, it’s a Spending Clause statute, I would have thought that Congress would have understood and we should interpret this language in that light, that you cannot use the money as a weapon to control these things. And, in fact, of course, as you know, the Court has some anti-commandeering law. That’s doctrinal speak for you can’t always use money without—and claim you’re not controlling what’s going on. And I wonder whether we should take particular cognizance of that here given that these statutes sometimes constitute, we’re told, 10 percent of all the funding that state governments receive.
Justice Neil Gorsuch
This regulation affects, we’re told, 10 million healthcare workers and will cost over a billion dollars for employers to comply with. So what’s your reaction to that? Why isn’t this a regulation that effectively controls the employment and tenure of healthcare workers at hospitals, an issue Congress said the agency didn’t have the authority, that should be left to states to regulate?
Their exchange went on for a while, but essentially, counsel for HHS agreed to Gorsuch’s point somewhat, but then gave other examples where HHS set requirements as a condition to get funding such as requiring doctors to be licensed for instance, which no one has beef with. So clearly, there’s some leeway within his concern.
He argues specifically that he felt setting standards doesn’t constitute control. I mean, it kinda is, but hey. Lawyers get paid to come up with colorful arguments, and lawyers who got to argue in front of SCOTUS are the best in the biz.
After The Biden admin peeps finished their arguments, it was time for Missouri to launch their campaign. For that job, they turned to none other than Jesus himself—Jesus Osete.
Counsel Jesus Osete
In his argument, he took issue that the provision that gives HHS the power to act in the interest of the health and safety of patients, that those Biden fuckers are ignoring a lot of other shit to make their claim that it’s OK to add a vaccine mandate of this nature.
Justice Kagan, apparently not having a Jesus fish on her car, was unimpressed with counsel Osete’s argument. It seems being in a 3:6 minority is wearing on her, because she’s been rather belligerent as of late. But to be fair, anti-vax zealots are clearly annoying to me too, so I guess I can’t blame her too much. Either way, her exchange with counsel Osete turned the “testy” level all the way to eleven.
She was asking him for instance, if they can require hospitals to sterilize necessary equipment to prevent infection, which counsel Osete agreed to. So she was like, “then how the fuck is this any different, mother fucker?”
The exchange between them was long AF, so I’m not copying it here, and Justice Kagan was not exactly allowing counsel Osete to make his point anyway, by setting a Guiness World Record for interrupting a respondent. But it’s also true, that counsel Osete was acting in a manner that’s kinda like, “If you don’t like the question, answer the question you wished they’d asked, instead of what they actually asked. He was definitely in spin mode.
Justice Elena Kagan
Counsel Osete really wanted to hammer home the idea that smaller hospitals would be “devastated” by the rule HHS has adopted. Let’s be clear about what he’s saying. Small hospitals have so many anti-vaccine assholes in their midst, that such a rule, would cripple them.
I’m not sure what kind of data he’s citing to make such an astounding claim, but I’d like to believe that anti-vaccine zealots in the health care industry, are the fringe, not the norm. Although, to be fair, plenty of credible doctors were silenced for promoting the idea that natural immunity shouldn’t be ignored entirely, and if someone already contracted COVID, maybe a vaccine wasn’t completely necessary for them.
After the epic battle with Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh brought up a unique question when he asked:
First, this is an unusual administrative law situation from my experience because the people who are regulated are not here complaining about the regulation, the — the hospitals and healthcare organizations.
It’s a very unusual situation. They, in fact, overwhelmingly appear to support the Secretary’s — the CMS regulation.
So I want — and the government makes something of that. What — what are we to make of that?
Justice Brett Kavanaugh
It is a valid point, that the regulation in many ways, is probably a rule the hospitals wanted to impose themselves, but figured it’d piss off their employees. So getting HHS to make the law instead lets the hospitals off the hook so they can be like, “Hey, it’s not our rule! We’re with you *wink-wink*, it’s those nasty assholes at HHS. Sorry. Here’s your shot.”
Justice Kavanaugh went on to give Counsel Osete an opportunity to ultimately explain his beef with Justice Kagan’s line of questioning.
He asked:
How is a vaccine different in kind, from your perspective, from, say, the requirement to wear gloves or the requirement to wash your hands or the other kinds of requirements? Because I think, if you acknowledge that there’s authority to require the latter, then you need to explain why the — the vaccine is different.
His response:
I don’t think I could say it any better than Chief Judge Sutton did at page 12 of his dissent in the OSHA case, which is masks can come off, gloves can come off.
A vaccine requirement, the taking a vaccine is a permanent medical procedure that cannot come off after work is over.
That is, there are — there are materially different conditions, materially different procedures at stake. And when you look at the context, for example, in the hospital requirement, 1395x(e), nothing in that statute comes close to authorizing this precise mandate in this case, which is going to have devastating consequences for vast swaths of this country, Your Honor.
He at least made a valid point as to the distinctions, even if it isn’t necessarily a distinction the law authorizing HHS to do their jobs makes.
Amici for Missouri, Elizabeth Murrill (an amici is an interested third party, which is not part of the suit, but has officially added their opinion to the case) opened her oral arguments with this:
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case is not about whether vaccines are effective, useful, or a good idea. It’s about whether this federal executive branch agency has the power to force millions of people working for or with a Medicare or Medicaid provider to undergo an invasive, irrevocable, forced medical treatment, a COVID shot.
It’s a bureaucratic power move that is unprecedented. If it can do that, the question still remains as to whether it properly exercised that power here.
The district court answered no to both questions at the preliminary injunction stage, and the court below supported its ruling with a number of well-reasoned conclusions. Now, without even addressing all the underlying bases for the ruling, the government asks this Court to jump ahead of the Fifth Circuit and dissolve the injunction, irrevocably changing the status quo in a way that will effectively give the federal government all the relief it seeks.
This will create chaos in state provider networks, limit access to care for the poor and needy, and eviscerate informed consent for millions of people. The Court should reject the government’s request and maintain the status quo because the district court’s holdings were correct on all counts. I’m happy to take questions or speak to some of the questions that have already been asked by the Court.
Elizabeth Murrill
While she also makes a colorful point, I’d argue that a fundamental flaw is her omission of the options. That at no point is the law requiring any health care worker to get a vaccine. It’s forcing employers to mandate workers to do so, if they want to be receive funds from Eminem.
While it is clear that these hospitals depend on these programs for a huge chunk of their cash flow, and rejecting it, would basically put them out of business, I think alluding to the fact that the option is there, but that it’s just impractical, would be a better and more honest approach than acting like the option is non-existent, which seems more like the argument a politician would make, versus a highly competent lawyer who’s qualified to argue in front of SCOTUS.
So on to the decision. While the conservative majority was not ready to give OSHA such broad powers to regulate vaccinating and masking in all workplaces in the other case, Justices Roberts and Kavanaugh, joined the left-leaning justices to form a different majority who sided with the Biden administration, allowing HHS to regulate their industry in such a specific way. Because this was a much more narrow rule, affecting only health care workers that make a living off of government funding, it wasn’t the broad sweeping power OSHA tried to implement, and thus one they were willing to let lie.
In their dissent, Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett accepted the majority’s reasoning to some extent, but simply believed that HHS had no written authority from congress to enact such a strong regulation. If congress had intended HHS to have such power, they’d have expressly written so in the law creating HHS.
In a case, which wins the award for being the longest named SCOTUS case of the last decade or so, we’re talking about COVID. Remember that shit?
In order to minimize the risk to American workers during the COVID pandemic, the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA), back in November of 2021, issued a mandate that any company with over 100 employees either require employees to get vaccinated, or wear a mask when at work.
While OSHA isn’t the CDC, they felt it was within their jurisdiction, in order to make sure people were safe at work, from anti-vaccine anti-mask zealots.
The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) and others filed suit, arguing that this was not within OSHA’s rights to make such a regulation.
Because it was a pandemic issue, and the petitioner’s were seeking a stay of the order that would go into effect in a matter of days, SCOTUS decided to fast track this shit, and hear arguments much faster than normal.
The NFIB’s arguments are basically that this shit would cost employers a shit ton of money. Not that they would be forced to buy the masks or the vaccines, but instead, there are a good number of their employees who are anti-vaccine anti-mask zealots who’d rather take their toys, go home, and quit like the little anti-science crybabies they are, than protect their fellow coworkers.
Actual Photo of Anti-Mask Anti-Vaccine Person
I know it might seem anti-libertarian on the face of it to attack these anti-vaccine folks, but this is the Logical Libertarian, not the Zealous Libertarian, or Anarchist Pseudo-Libertarian. Vaccines fucking work, and any dangers that have been uncovered through the years were not only minimal, but highly overshadowed by their benefits. Any argument to the contrary is either born of ignorance or malice.
On this page, we promote science and libertarianism combined in a logical approach. I’m not interested in hosting an anarchist site where I call myself libertarian just because I know most people hate anarchy as much as they hate communism.
As I see it, the difference between anarchy and libertarianism, is libertarianism promotes the idea that government should exist to protect people’s rights. So while it is fair to debate the merits of all this, and others are welcome to differ in opinion, vaccines aren’t just about saving the vaccinated person’s life, it’s about protecting others they come in contact with. While I do oppose hard vaccine mandates, where everyone must get one no matter what, I think conditional mandates like this are arguably protecting people’s right to life, while still being optional.
A good analogy would be, if you want to drive a car on our roads, you have to agree not to be drunk when doing so. Few libertarians are promoting getting rid of all drunk driving laws. So arguing, “if you want to work for an employer, you have to make a reasonable effort not to put other employees at risk from sickness and death,” isn’t a hugely different proposal.
Obviously, disagreement and fair counter-arguments are always welcome. It just needs to be acknowledged that it’s a fair argument, and there are also fair arguments opposing it. Zealots who can’t accept this, are invited to cordially eat my entire ass.
Apologies for the distraction, I’ll get back to this case in front of SCOTUS now.
Scott Keller, counsel for the NFIB opened with an argument that basically hit two main points. One, OSHA has never regulated vaccines before, and that this rule, effectively makes businesses a “de-facto public health agency” as he put it.
But shortly after his opening arguments, Justice Kagan was having none of his argument. She chimed in with this:
Mr. Keller, I don’t understand the point. Whatever “necessary” means, whether it’s necessary and proper or whether it’s something more than that, why isn’t this necessary to abate a grave risk? This is a pandemic in which nearly a million people have died.
It is by far the greatest public health danger that this country has faced in the last century.
More and more people are dying every day.
More and more people are getting sick every day.
I don’t mean to be dramatic here.
I’m just sort of stating facts. And this is the policy that is most geared to stopping all this.
There’s nothing else that will perform that function better than incentivizing people strongly to vaccinate themselves. So, you know, whatever “necessary” means, whatever “grave” means, why isn’t this necessary and grave?
Justice Elena Kagan
One of the arguments presented by both counselors for the petitioners was that OSHA generally regulates issues that are specific dangers to specific businesses.
For instance, if your business operates a forklift in a warehouse, they’ll regulate how that forklift is to be used to ensure some dumb fuck operating the forklift doesn’t run over some idiot worker not paying attention when a heavy vehicle is driving around next to them.
Or maybe you’re a roofer, OSHA might regulate you wear a safety harness so your dumb ass doesn’t fall 50 feet to your fucking death because you’re clumsy as fuck, and lost your footing. Shit like that.
But this rule, seems to be a nationwide sweeping rule that applies to everyone, everywhere, all the time. Basically, their beef is that if you were the type of worker who is essentially on your own, maybe driving around in a car by yourself, or out on some location where you’re not around other people as a necessary requirement of your job, a vaccine or mask in your situation isn’t really protecting anyone. So then it becomes an overreach.
The second counsel for the petitioners, Benjamin Flowers, hit this point home with his opening argument:
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: OSHA typically identifies a workplace danger and then regulates it.
But, here, the President decided to regulate a danger and then told OSHA to find a work-related basis for doing so.
This resulted in the vaccine mandate, a blunderbuss rule, nationwide in scope, that requires the same thing of all covered employers, regardless of the other steps they’ve taken to protect employees, regardless of the nature of their workplaces, regardless of their employees’ risk factors, and regardless of local conditions that state and local officials are far better positioned to understand and accommodate. So sweeping a rule is not necessary to protect employees from a grave danger as the emergency provision requires.
And I want to be clear that states share OSHA’s desire to bring this pandemic to a close, but the agency cannot pursue that laudable goal unlawfully. I welcome your questions.
Benjamin Flowers
He went on to argue, that COVID isn’t a workplace danger, it’s just a danger that exists in the world right now. While he didn’t say it, I think he’s effectively arguing this is the purview of the CDC to regulate, or congress to pass a law, not OSHA.
Using my forklift example, he’s basically arguing that’s not a danger I face at home. It’s specifically a workplace risk. But COVID is a danger I face everywhere. Ergo, not a workplace risk. Ergo, not the purview of OSHA.
But Justice Kagan was having none of this noise. She passionately fired back:
Well, why not? I mean, the combination of lots of people all going in to one indoor space and having to deal with each other for eight hours, ten hours, however many hours a day, in those settings, the combination of the environment and the people that are in that environment create a risk, I would think.
I mean, tell me if I’m wrong about this.
I would think that workplace risk is about the greatest least controllable risk with respect to COVID that any person has. You know, everything else a person can control.
You can go to the baseball game or not go to the baseball game.
You can decide who to go to the baseball game with.
But you can’t do any of that in workplaces.
You have to be there.
You have to be there for eight hours a day.
You have to be there in the exact environment that the workplace is set up with. And you have to be there with a bunch of people you don’t know and who might be completely irresponsible. Where else do people have a greater risk than at the workplace?
One question I have in all this, is while counsel made some pretty creative arguments to the distinction of workplace risk, versus general risk, at no point did anyone arguing for NFIB point out that OSHA has such a distinction in law prohibiting it from creating a regulation to lessen a general risk that also occurs in the workplace.
Whenever I have such questions, there’s a part of me that recognizes, these counselors and justices have forgotten more about law than I’ll ever know, and that surely, they thought of this, it was somehow addressed, and my feeble legal mind just doesn’t understand.
But then there’s another part of me that thinks, “Well, I’m not an idiot. Sometimes, even really talented people make dumb mistakes or oversights. Maybe I’m on to something.” So then I get this notion that if only I were in the halls of the Supreme Court, and could just raise my hand and chime in, I’d be a hero.
Moving on…
Justice Breyer also chimed in, with a well-researched refutation of counsel’s argument, that people who aren’t at risk get no exception:
What this says, what I mean, my law clerks have been busy beavers on this case, I promise you, and what they have on this issue is that there are exceptions here.
There aren’t exceptions business by business, but there are exceptions, those who work from home, alone, or substantially outdoors, or those who can show that their conditions, practices, means, methods, operations, or processes make their workplaces as safe and healthful as the ETS can obtain a variance, okay? So they did make some distinctions.
Not industry by industry, but my question really is, that I’d like to turn this to, is a stay.
You heard what I asked.
Justice Stephen Breyer
I mean, you know, 750 million new cases yesterday or close to that is a lot. I don’t mean to be facetious. But that’s why I said I would find it, you know, unbelievable that it could be in the public interest to suddenly stop these vaccinations.
And the only answer that was given was a lot of people will quit. Well, OSHA considered that.
My wonderful law clerk has 61475, 63422, 61466, 61 474 and 475, those are pages.
I don’t think you should read all 61,000, but, nonetheless, there are at least five or 10 pages where they went into this, and they said, in our view, hmm, yeah, that’s right, some people may quit, maybe 3 percent.
But more may quit when they discover they have to work together with unvaccinated others because that means they may get the disease.
Okay? And more will quit because they’ll be — maybe die or maybe they’ll be in the hospital or maybe they’ll be sick and have to stay home for two weeks.
So they did the pros and cons. So I’d like to take Justice Kagan’s questions, which I think I share on the merits, and just ask you, are you asking us both still to issue a stay today, tomorrow, Monday, and why, if you are?
It’s also worth noting, that while many painted this as a vaccine mandate, there was the option to wear a mask, if one chose not to vaccinate, making it not a mandate.
During the argument from OSHA, Justice Roberts expressed concern that the president is essentially side-stepping congressional action, by getting government agencies to regulate on multiple fronts. He didn’t mention the president directly, so that’s just my interpretation of it.
Justice John Roberts
The point being, congress passes laws, agencies pass regulations. Getting congress to pass a law is a bitch. But if the president wants an agency, or in this case, multiple agencies to create a regulation, which essentially carries the same weight as a law, they just tell them to do fucking do it or get canned. In so doing, it’s basically the president making law, instead of congress.
Justice Alito, also looking for some distinction between this, and other previous OSHA actions asked this:
On the issue of whether you’re trying to squeeze an elephant into a mouse hole and the question of whether this is fundamentally different from anything that OSHA has ever done before, I want to see if it might be fundamentally different in at least two respects and get your answer to the question. Most OSHA regulations, all of the ones with which I’m familiar, affect employees when they are on the job but not when they are not on the job.
And this affects employees all the time.
If you’re vaccinated while you’re on the job, you’re vaccinated when you’re not on the job. Isn’t this different from anything OSHA has done before in that respect?
Justice Samuel Alito
Counsel was quick to correct Justice Alito, that there is a mask option, making it not a permanent action, necessarily.
While Justice Alito went out of his way to agree that the vaccines were safe and effective, he wanted to address that there is some level of risk in a vaccine. So one contention he raised, was asking whether OSHA had imposed any other rules where the person was asked to do something that carried with it additional risk.
While he was directing it at counsel, Justice Sotomayor could not resist an awkward argument between them, where they both were acting like they were talking to counsel for OSHA, but they were clearly trying to tell the other, “Stop being such a fucking idiot, you asshole.”
Sorry, I know this is getting long-winded, but there’s some interesting shit in here. One thing I think that’s worth learning; you’ll hear reference to the “Major questions doctrine.” As I mentioned earlier, Justice Robert’s expressed concern that maybe the president was acting as a lawmaker, by using regulatory agencies to make things happen. The “major questions doctrine” is basically at the heart of what Justice Roberts was asking. If there’s something that is a major question the people should likely decide, allowing unelected agencies to regulate it, is not appropriate, and instead should be a law passed by the people’s representatives instead.
Since laws and regulations have essentially the same power, it’s at least a distinction as to when a law should be passed, versus a regulation be written. A bigger distinction of course being that an agency is generally specialized, and lawmakers aren’t specialists. So for instance, if we’re talking about health issues, lawmakers probably wouldn’t know how to write a law about specific healthcare actions, and instead would leave that up to the FDA or CDC. Congress merely grants those agencies the power to do those things.
Justice Gorsuch, seemingly concerned about Justice Roberts’ point about circumventing congress fairly pointed out:
So my question with respect to the major questions doctrine is this: We accept that it’s not our role to decide public health questions, but it is our important job to decide who should decide those questions. I think we all agree on that.
And, here, our choice on the one hand is a federal agency and on the other hand the Congress of the United States and state governments. Now you argue we should not consider the major questions doctrine unless and until we find a statutory ambiguity.
I understand that.
Justice Neil Gorsuch
But let’s — let’s say the Court does find such an ambiguity.
I know you’ll contest the premise, but let’s just work on it. If — if there is an ambiguity, why isn’t this a major question that, therefore, belongs to the people’s representatives of the states and in the halls of Congress, given that the statute at issue here is, as the Chief Justice pointed out, 50 years old, doesn’t address this question. The rule affects, I believe, we’re told, 80 million people, and the government reserves the right to extend it to every private business in the country. Traditionally, states have had the responsibility for overseeing vaccination mandates.
I rejected a challenge to one just the other day from New Mexico. Congress has had a year to act on the question of vaccine mandates already.
As the Chief Justice points out, it appears that the federal government is going agency by agency as a workaround to its inability to get Congress to act. The risks imposed here are not unilateral.
There are risks to those who choose not to be vaccinated that they’re trying to avoid sometimes, as you discussed with Justice Alito and conceded to him. Traditionally, OSHA has had rules that affect workplace hazards that are unique to the workplace and don’t involve hazards that affect individuals 24 hours a day. So that’s kind of the general tick list we have before us, and I’d just like you to address, again, the question, assuming the statute’s ambiguous, why isn’t this a major question that normally under our Constitution would reserve — be reserved for the people’s representatives in the states in the first instance and in the halls of Congress in the second?
Elizabeth Prelogar, for OSHA, while acknowledging the premise of the question, simply argued that OSHA’s mission statement, given to it by congress, is protecting workers in the workplace, which is what this regulation does.
If there were any argument presented that seemed to really make the case against this regulation, was when Justice Gorsuch asked about why they don’t have similar rules for the flu.
Elizabeth Prelogar
Counsel Prolegar’s answer was fair, but presents basically a subjectivity issue. Influenza can be deadly, but at the time, COVID deaths were far higher than any recent influenza mortality rates. She also pointed out that influenza is seasonal and consistent, whereas COVID was new.
In retrospect, the evidence now suggests COVID will be seasonal and consistent, too. But, essentially, she was drawing a line that hadn’t been established, that the severity of the disease gives them cause to act.
Weirdly, I’m surprised she didn’t just respond that COVID was officially a pandemic at the time, influenza was not. But maybe she wasn’t ready for that question, and didn’t think of that answer. Or, maybe I’m a fucking idiot.
Anyway, in a per curium opinion (that just means it wasn’t authored by any one justice, and it was a pretty brief opinion), that was drawn along partisan lines, the right-wing majority sided with the NFIB. They said that such a large and sweeping rule, should either be delegated by congress or written by congress. This was simply too significant for OSHA to do on its own.
They wrote:
Permitting OSHA to regulate the hazards of daily life — simply because most Americans have jobs and face those same risks while on the clock — would significantly expand OSHA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.
So there you have it. OSHA gets smacked down, and congress and the president have a better understanding of their roles and the jobs they must do, and must not do going forward
I applaud OSHA for trying their level best, but frankly, it’s hard to disagree with this opinion. While this particular regulation may have seemed like a good thing and saved a significant number of lives, these same powers, if not reigned in, could and would be used for things any one of us may not agree with in the future.
So let’s talk about the first amendment, y’all. The beginning of that baby goes like this, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” It goes on to talk about free speech and shit, but that’s basically what it says on religion.
You know what it doesn’t say? “Separation of church and state.”
So where did the “separation” phrase come from? Well, it turns out, in 1802, one Thomas Jefferson wrote a letter to a church group, describing the first amendment saying religion was:
A matter which lies solely between Man & his God.
He went on to write:
I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between Church & State.
Thomas Jefferson
So, why the history lesson instead of some SCOTUS shit? I’m getting to that.
Since then, SCOTUS has often interpreted the first amendment via precedent, to mean what Jefferson wrote. So while the amendment says “congress shall make no law,” on numerous occasions, SCOTUS has ruled against religious involvement in government, even when it has nothing to do with congress making a law, honoring what Jefferson considered the intent of the first amendment, to create a wall of separation between church and state.
While I’m agnostic-atheist, and agree with the philosophy of their decision, one should still note, what the constitution actually says, as justices like the late Antonin Scalia, and his still sitting counterpart Clarence Thomas largely believe it wasn’t SCOTUS’ fucking business to think about what the writers of the text meant when they wrote it, but that their job was to be strict textualists, and interpret the constitution as written. What Scalia called a “Dead document.“
They fairly argue(d) that there was an amendment process set forth in the constitution. So if the populace doesn’t like the fucking text, Congress can endeavor to amend that shit. If they’re successful, then SCOTUS will rule and review based on the new amended text.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia
So this case, centers around this debate, in my estimation. You see, in Maine, kids are guaranteed a free education, which is to be administrated by a Maine government agency known as School Administrative Units (SAUs). If an area doesn’t have schools of its own, the SAU for that area is to pay to send those rugrats to an approved school in the area.
In order to be approved, the school has to meet certain standards. One of which, was that it be secular. Meaning, they can’t be in there shoving God up these kids asses. This is based on the “Separation of church and state” philosophy which SCOTUS has several precedents aligned with.
Here’s the rub, the text says, “congress shall make no law…” So this is a bit of a quagmire. Because if a religious school is prohibited by law from getting government funds and/or approval status, one could colorfully argue it’s kinda a law prohibiting free expression.
Anyway, a handful of bible-thumping parents live in some no-school-having shit district in Maine, and want to send their kids to Jesus Christ University. Since Maine law is like, “that’s fine, but you’re paying for that shit yourself, the parents were like, “Fuck y…I mean bless you, you wonderful heathens. We shall see thine ass in court.”
Counsel Michael Bindas
Early in the arguments, counsel for the petitioner (the bible thumpers), Michael Bindas made a clever argument:
This program does not fund schools. And if religious schools were allowed to participate, it does not fund schools.
It funds families. And not a penny can go to any school but for the genuine private choice of individuals.
His argument being, it isn’t that government funds are paying an institution to teach religion. It’s paying families to educate their kids. Those families can use those funds for the school of their choice, so long as they’re teaching the basic requirements expected of a public school. Allowing said parents the “free exercise” of their religion.
While inventive, I can’t help but wonder what requirements public schools have for teaching science, such as evolution by natural selection, and whether these schools are compliant with that? But I suppose, my atheist views are tiresome to these folks.
A panel for Maine, including retired SCOTUS justice David Souter, argued that they’re not excluding the school solely because of their religious backing, but because they’re teaching religion. That if their curriculum were secular, and they left the religious shit to the church, nobody would give a fuck.
Justice David Souter
The opponents are like, “Cute distinction, bro. But there’s nothing in the constitution supporting that logic.”
But Maine was like, “Listen you Jesus freaks. All we’re saying is, if we’re paying for your schooling, it should be consistent with all the other public schools in Maine, so all these kids in Maine get the same basic education. But because y’all are Jesus’ biggest fans, we know you’re not teaching shit like evolution, for instance, because you guys suck at science.”
They argued, “If these assholes lived in a real fucking city in Maine with real schools, they’d get a real education. Not this “creationism” bullshit you’re surely pushing on your poor kids. So if we’re going to fucking pay for it, we expect them to get the same quality education they’d get at a public school which teaches real science. Capiche?”
Justice Kavanaugh hit home the crux of the petitioner’s argument with this question to the respondent (Maine):
Brett M. Kavanaugh
I just want to follow up on that question from Justice Gorsuch. I think it’s important on this public discord or strife issue to emphasize that, as I understand it, they are seeking equal treatment, not special treatment. They’re saying “don’t treat me worse because I want to send my children to a religious school rather than a secular school. Treat me the same as the secular parent next door.”
I think that’s what they’re asking for, is equal treatment. Special treatment cases are where you’re asking for an exemption from generally applicable law.
That’s the Smith kind of cases. Those are hard cases.
But, here, I think all they’re asking for is equal treatment. And the question then becomes public discord from equal treatment. To follow up on Justice Gorsuch’s question, how should we think about that?
Malcolm L. Stewart
I mean, they are certainly characterizing what they are asking for as equal treatment.
But Maine’s view and our view is they are seeking a benefit different from the one that Maine is willing to provide. Maine is willing to provide a secular education, an education that is the rough analog to what the public school would give you at state expense.
It’s not willing to pay for religious inculcation. And so it’s like a case where the school that doesn’t believe in athletics says, I’m being treated unequally because you are willing to fund a thing that is important to some other schools but not to me. That’s not the kind of equal treatment that either the Free Speech Clause or the Free Exercise Clause would prohibit.
The federal government and the National Association of School Boards both filed briefs supporting Maine as well.
Some cases are really complicated, and frankly take me a long time to even make sense of what the fuck they’re arguing over. Usually some stupid procedural bullshit SCOTUS seems to love, because they’re law nerds or whatever. But this one? Pretty fucking simple, yeah?
In a predictable outcome with the now largely religious conservative majority, a partisan 6:3 decision went to the Jesus freaks. I guess the text trumps everything else. Justice John Roberts argued in his majority opinion that if Maine doesn’t like it, they can build some public fucking schools in that area.
The majority’s reasoning is that Maine’s law violated the “free expression” clause for the parents, who want to teach their kids about the ten commandments.
In dissent, the court’s left-leaning justices basically said, “you fucking conservative assholes are so worried about the “free expression” clause, you don’t seem to give two fucks about the “establishment” clause. If the government pays for these kids to go to these schools, government is fucking establishing religious values in these kids.
While I’m not the tenth SCOTUS justice, it is my firm opinion, if Maine had wanted to win this case, it should have gotten some parents who wanted to send their kid to a Muslim school and get government to pay for it, to join these Christians. I’ve little doubt, the majority would have thought much harder about Maine’s argument if they were about to support the teachings of Allah.
Back in 1989, all around piece of shit, David Martinez Ramirez decided to murder his girlfriend and her 15 year old daughter whom he admitted to raping multiple times in the past, as well as right before he’d killed her.
Ramirez’s case leaves little doubt to his guilt. He was found with the bodies in his apartment, covered in blood. Along with the admissions of what he had done to the daughter, it’s pretty much an open and shut case.
All Around Scumbag David Ramirez
However, after he was convicted, he somehow got the idea in his head that he got screwed, so he appealed his conviction, and when he lost over and over again, he even petitioned SCOTUS who were like, “Fuck you, buddy. We’re not going to waste our time with this shit. Burn in hell.”
So why is this case here at SCOTUS then?
Well, you see, Ramirez isn’t just a piece of shit morally, he’s also a piece of shit financially. As such, he couldn’t hire an attorney when he got busted, and instead, got a court appointed attorney. And, it wasn’t even a creative one like Saul Goodman, either. His counsel had zero experience in capital crimes cases. And when I say zero, apparently she’d never even witnessed a capital case from the sidelines. Yet here she is, trying to give this mother fucker the best defense money can’t buy.
So after Ramirez predictably lost, he tried to appeal his sentencing for various reasons in state court. He basically was trying to avoid the death penalty, not to get off for the crime as a whole. Unfortunately, none of his claims were about ineffective counsel. This is the start of his problems.
After he lost on appeal, he went to Arizona Supreme Court, and they were like, “Nah fam, we’re good. Not interested. Enjoy those death penalty drugs, bro.”
Getting no help in Arizona at all, Ramirez filed an appeal in federal court. The federal court however looked at everything and was like, “Yo, Ramirez…call us crazy, but we’re pretty sure your lawyer here doesn’t know what the fuck they’re doing. You sure you want to proceed with this idiot?”
At the heart of the federal courts thoughts on this, was that Ramirez was found competent to understand what he did by a psychologist, justifying the death penalty. Basically, they tend to avoid killing someone who they think is mentally handicapped, because it seems too cruel.
But after his conviction, it came to light, that he had been diagnosed as mentally disabled, and suffered severe abuse himself as a child, including that his shit parents didn’t even feed this fuck for days on end.
So the psychologist was like, “Woah, why didn’t you assholes tell me this ahead of time? I’m trying to diagnose this piece of shit. Didn’t you think that’d be clinically relevant to my diagnosis?”
After allowing Ramirez to amend his appeal to include a claim of “ineffective counsel” they found that Ramirez had never complained about this before in state courts. The rules set forth in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), basically require you to develop evidence for ineffective counsel BEFORE you get to federal court, otherwise, you can pound sand.
As near as I can tell, they’re basically trying to prevent someone about to get the needle from just throwing out any new defense they can think of, clogging up the courts, just to get out of being put to death.
Also, in Arizona, you have to wait until your trial is over to claim ineffective counsel, because they basically assume you wouldn’t have evidence to support this until after the trial is over. Like by some miracle, you might actually win anyway, or some shit. Plus, kinda a big distraction from the trial at hand.
But in a previous SCOTUS case, Martinez v. Ryan, SCOTUS did rule you can bring up an “ineffective counsel” claim at federal court for this first time.
So the contradiction here is that while SCOTUS said you can bring up the claim, AEDPA says you can’t bring any evidence up to develop that claim at federal court. How does that make a lick of fucking sense, right?
So while the state court was like, “We don’t give a fuck. This quack’s new opinion that maybe he was more fucked up than he originally thought, it wouldn’t have changed a fucking thing for us. We can’t wait to fry this motherfucker like a Chicken McNugget,” the federal court, and I mean every fucking judge on the 9th circuit was like, “Woah, woah, WOAH! What the fuck is wrong with you assholes? Look at that shit again. You need to let this motherfucker bring evidence forth to establish this claim of ineffective counsel.”
It’s also worth noting that while SCOTUS long ago ruled you have the right to effective counsel at trial as part of the 6th amendment, that’s AT TRIAL. They don’t seem to have much of an opinion on whether you have such a right after you’ve been convicted.
As for this case, SCOTUS didn’t give a fuck about Ramirez and his guilt. That shit is settled. They’re here to determine this conflict where AEDPA’s rule prohibits a federal court from hearing Ramirez’s evidence for ineffective counsel at trial if it wasn’t done at the state level, while their own precedent says that he can bring up a claim for ineffective counsel.
Counsel for Ramirez closed with a pretty impassioned and fair argument.
Robert M. Loeb
To say that you have a forum for hearing and one where no one’s ever succeeded in to raise an actual innocence claim is not giving you a forum to vindicate one of the most vital rights, the right to effective trial counsel. You know, whether you’re innocent or guilty, you have a right to a fair hearing.
You have a right to an effective trial counsel.
You have a right to have that vindicated. So it’s like them saying, if you’re coaching a basketball game and one team gets five players and one team gets one player and we’re going to play the game, but, at the end of the game, we’re going to give you a shot from half court and that’s going to make the game fair, that does not make the game fair, Your Honor. There is a right to have trial counsel here, and there was never a fair trial for Mr. Ramirez.
Right? And the fact that they give a Hail Mary opportunity for relief at the end of the day or can give a pardon that does not mean that the right to effective trial counsel is being vindicated here. And as Justice Sotomayor pointed out, as a third argument, which pertains only to Mr. Ramirez, which there was no real meaningful response here, because Mr. Ramirez in the appeal before the panel in the Ninth Circuit clearly was relying on materials beyond that which was presented to the state court. And that was not rejected by the state before the panel.
It was not objected to.
They didn’t say, well, (e)(2) bars consideration of that evidence.
They told the panel to consider that evidence. And the panel then went on to render a decision based on the arguments that they made without even them raising (e)(2).
And, of course, then they have the audacity in their cert position, it’s like to say, well, (e)(2) is not even mentioned in the Ninth Circuit decision.
Well, it’s not mentioned because they didn’t raise it. So there it’s completely sandbagged the Ninth Circuit panel here by only raising this in the en banc petition and then their cert petition and blaming the panel for never reaching the issue that they didn’t raise.
They made a decision not to raise (e)(2) before the panel.
That’s a waiver.
It was not fair to the panel.
It’s certainly not fair to Mr. Ramirez. He would have responded to the (e)(2) argument if it was raised before the panel. So, for Mr. Ramirez, you should affirm on the additional basis that the claims against him were waived.
In a 6:3 partisan decision, Justice Clarence Thomas and company sided with Shinn (The state of Arizona). Congress wrote AEDPA, and it says what it says. States are supposed to have power over their jurisdictions vs federal courts. So if they lay out a procedure, and someone they convict doesn’t follow it, well, them’s the breaks.
Justice Thomas basically said, it’s not fair for the federal government to come in and tell the state how to do their business of running a court, conviction, etc., unless it violates the constitution, which nothing here does. That while they did rule in Martinez to allow the introduction of “ineffective counsel” claims, their ruling was quite narrow, and only applied to such claims, where someone was denied constitutional rights, not this shit Ramirez is facing.
It’s also worth noting, about half of Thomas’ opinion cited the heinousness of the underlying crimes, which wasn’t really at issue here, but clearly influenced the majority to not be keen to help this fucker in any way, avoid being put to death.
Kagan, Sotomayor, and Breyer however, were like, “You conservative pricks are racist, and clearly hate Latinos. If someone has shit counsel at the state level, and they don’t really figure it out until the federal level, you’re basically telling them you don’t care about justice, you just don’t want to waste anyone’s time. But this idiot’s gonna die in your interest of saving time, and that’s not cool.
AEDPA tried to set some sort of balance between the state’s rights to manage this shit, and the federal government’s rights to step in, if the state court isn’t acting to the defendant’s liking. But you assholes basically want to let the state do whatever the fuck they want.
After some snooze fests, and landmark abortion and gun rulings, we finally have an interesting case that involves the holy trinity of crime—murder, violence, and robbery.
So all around scumbag, Justin Eugene Taylor, and some merry idiot he was with, decided that they needed some money. They were drug “wholesalers,” had some drugs to sell, and had a willing low level dealer with money looking to buy. Deciding this dipshit likely had a lot of money on him, they hatched a brilliant plan to rob this dude, take all his money, then keep the drugs and sell them to someone else. Taylor would play the role of Baby Driver, and his accomplice would do the dirty deed. What could possibly go wrong?
As their plan unfolded, their victim, less than thrilled about the idea of being robbed, got his ass shot and killed. Weirdly, despite this, the Taylor Gang failed to get the money. Not sure why, seems kinda wasteful to kill a motherfucker and not take the money you killed him for. But I’m guessing we’re not talking about a pair of genius criminal minds, here.
So Taylor was charged under the Hobbs Act, which basically aims to prevent interstate or foreign commerce robbery and/or extortion, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Taylor, knowing the jig was up, decided he was ready to go all Monty Hall, and make a deal. He plead guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery, and using a firearm to commit a “crime of violence.” The deal was if he plead guilty to these two, the government would drop the remaining charges.
The “crime of violence” thing, is what’s at issue here, as it relates to the relationship between the Hobbs Act and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which in subsection 3A reads,
(3)For purposes of this subsection the term “crime of violence” means an offense that is a felony and—
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another
One thing you learn about law, is that it isn’t like speaking English to your buddy, where words are fungible. Like, you might be hanging out, and see someone you find attractive and go “Fuck!” Or you might accidentally run into a brick wall and go “Fuck!” Two very different meanings for the same word like that, aren’t really helpful in law, because it creates too much uncertainty.
To combat this, in law, many words or phrases have specific definitions, and are often even defined in the law so there’s no question about what specifically is meant. So “crime of violence” has a specific definition, as listed above.
Taylor was like, “Sure I used a gun, and I attempted to commit robbery under the Hobbs Act. But you convicted me under the premise that an attempted robbery under the Hobbs Act, is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). But here’s the problem, dude. Since I made that plea, those generous fucks at SCOTUS were nice enough to redefine “Crime of Violence” in my favor, so I’m rethinking my fucking plea.”
You see Johnson v. United States (2015) narrowed the definition of “Crime of violence” which said, “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” because they said it was constitutionally vague, which basically means, it doesn’t draw a clear line as to what is a crime versus not a crime.
Still confused on constitutionally vague? Here’s an easy way to think about it. Enacting a speed limit of “65 MPH” is NOT constitutionally vague, but enacting a speed limit of “around 65 mph or so” IS constitutionally vague. The latter is a problem, because if you’re driving along at 66 MPH, you’d have no reasonable way of knowing if you’re committing a crime, because that shit is vague! A lot of laws are struck down for this. It was part of the Roe v. Wade decision, even.
Anyway, back to Taylor. He complained, “Since my idiot partner shot this mother fucker, but then somehow didn’t grab the cash, it wasn’t a robbery, it was a failed attempt at a robbery, and thus doesn’t constitute a “crime of violence” under the new definition where SCOTUS cut out allusions to attempted crimes. And even better yet, they made that definition retroactive. So I declare I’m no longer guilty of this particular shit.”
What seems odd to me, and this is my Average Joe opinion, so I could be way the fuck off base, he took a plea deal for these charges, and in exchange, the other charges he was hit with originally (and guilty of) were dropped. The deal was presumably obtained based on the sentence the prosecutor thought he’d get. So if Taylor wins here in SCOTUS, I’m guessing they’ll likely just bring back those other charges against him, as this is effectively reneging on the plea deal, and presumably voids it.
So let me surmise. This dumb fuck and his friend killed someone for money, but in their infinite genius, didn’t actually take the fucking money. He made a deal to plea to two charges, but now his lawyer, being creative thinks he can reduce their sentence by arguing the shit he agreed to has been redefined by SCOTUS, and he’s no longer guilty of that crime. The argument being, that all he did was to attempt to threaten, but never actually did so.
Counsel for The United States, Rebecca Taibleson, obviously thinking this Taylor’s argument makes zero sense, tried to hit SCOTUS with this point:
I’m not sure that in the abstract a pure attempted threat is something that exists.
One clue to this is 18 U.S.C. 1512(a), a witness-tampering statute that criminalizes the witness tampering through the “use or threat of force, or attempts to do so.” So that sounds like it would capture attempted use and attempted threats, as well as use and threats. But then the penalty provision only provides penalties for uses of force, attempted uses of force, and threatened uses of force, which reflects, I think, the common-sense and textual intuition that there’s no such thing as an attempted threat in the abstract that does not itself attempt the use of force or threaten the use of force.
They also argue that attempted robberies are usually more violent than successful ones, because violence usually occurs when the victim resists. So this argument by Taylor would basically make the Hobbs Act and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) significantly more useless.
But, as SCOTUS Blog pointed out, counsel for Taylor gave this hypothetical:
Imagine a person planning to rob a convenience store, Dreeben told the justices. He plans to hand the cashier a threatening note but not to use any force. He writes the note and drives to the store, but when he sees police in the area, he leaves the scene. He is guilty of attempting a robbery because he intended to steal property through the threat of force, and he took a “substantial step” to carry out the plan. But, Dreeben said, his actions don’t rise to a “crime of violence” because he never used force or attempted to use it – and he never reached the point of threatening to use it, either.
In a 7:2 decision, where only justices Thomas and Alito dissented, Justice Gorsuch delivered the majority opinion, siding with Taylor. In order for Taylor to be guilty, the state has to prove Taylor intended to see this shit through, and even took steps to make it happen. Since Taylor just sat in the car, apparently blissfully ignorant his partner had a gun and planned on violently robbing this dipshit, he didn’t attempt a violent crime.
Read about the case and hear oral arguments in the links below.
This is almost assuredly the blockbuster case of this decade. It’s the one everyone is talking about, at least. So let’s dig in.
Y’all remember Roe v. Wade, right? Well, once Donald Trump had secured a 6:3 conservative majority in SCOTUS, largely on the promise of Roe v. Wade getting overturned if he was able to do so, Dobbs ended up being the case to do it.
Many Republican-majority states knew, if they started passing laws that blatantly violated Roe’s precedent, and the newly Republican-appointed super-majority were willing to consider overturning Roe, these laws which would have been easily struck down previously, would now meandered their way to SCOTUS. And so this one did, and SCOTUS happily granted certiori (agreed to hear it.)
This particular law was a 2018 Mississippi law called the “Gestational Age Act.” It basically told women that if they were going to terminate their pregnancy, they need to do it in the first fifteen weeks.
However, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a case in which SCOTUS upheld Roe, but modified it, they replaced the trimester scheme in Roe, and instead replaced it with one test—whether or not the fetus was viable.
So the petitioners, Jackson Women’s Health Organization (JWHO), were like, “Woah, you country bumpkin mother fuckers, Casey said we have until viability to make such a call. And fifteen weeks is a country fucking mile from viability. So we’ll see your asses in court.”
As usual, a lower court ruled, and told Mississippi that they were clearly out of line, that no evidence was provided to show 15 weeks met the “viability” requirement, and therefore violated the Casey precedent.
Counsel for Dobbs, started off by arguing:
Roe versus Wade and Planned Parenthood versus Casey haunt our country.
They have no basis in the Constitution.
They have no home in our history or traditions.
Nowhere else does this Court recognize a right to end a human life
~Scott G. Stewart
In citing the previous court in Casey, Justice Breyer pretty much let his position be known by forcefully pointing out the reasoning of a judicial philosophy called stare decisis (standing by what’s been decided previously). Speaking to Counsel Stewart, he asked:
It is particularly important to show what we do in overturning a case is grounded in principle and not social pressure, not political pressure. “Only the most convincing justification can show that a later decision overruling,” if that’s what we did, “was anything but a surrender to political pressures or new members.”
What do you say to that?
~Justice Breyer
He was sending a message to the six conservative justices, that overturning Roe should not be done to appease the presidents that appointed them, the party that brought them to power, or even the will of the people. That the decision should be based on logic—overturning a previous ruling should only be done, because the previous court, working with less information than the current court has, got their decision wrong.
Justice Thomas, questioning counsel for JWHO, asked a question, that I have to be honest, even puts me in a box I didn’t think I could be put in. My argument, as well as the argument from JWHO, is that this is a bodily autonomy issue, an extension of the 4th amendment’s right to be secure in your own person, or the 14th amendment, which guarantees life, liberty, and property rights.
He asked:
I am trying to look at the issue of bodily autonomy and whether or not she has a right also to bodily autonomy in the case of ingesting an illegal substance and causing harm to a pre-viability fetus.
~Justice Clarence Thomas
This is fucking tough to justify, and I honestly don’t know if I can. If a woman has a right to bodily autonomy that would allow her to abort a fetus, does she have the right to ingest a substance, such as drugs or alcohol, that would cause that fetus to be stillborn, or have severe birth defects?
I suppose if I were arguing for the pro-choice side, I might have had to suggest that an abortion terminates the fetus before it becomes a person with rights under the law, so it never becomes a person with rights under the law. But using drugs or alcohol, assuming the fetus comes to term, violates that person’s rights to life in perpetuity, because if it does become a person, it will be forever victimized by the mother’s actions until the person dies.
Counsel for WHO, either being less creative than me, or smarter than me, dodged the issue almost entirely, rejecting it as not germane to her argument, and focused instead on adherence to the philosophy of stare decisis , and the viability precedent. I don’t think failing to have an answer for this issue helped her.
Justice Barrett, pointing out that Roe and Casey both seemed to focus on the burdens of motherhood, as to why it was necessary for a woman to be able to exercise the right to an abortion, pushed counsel that because of this, it shouldn’t be problematic for the women to bring the child to term, then relinquish it for adoption.
Counsel Rikelman responded to this question with:
Pregnancy itself is unique. It imposes unique physical demands and risks on women and, in fact, has impact on all of their lives, on their ability to care for other children, other family members, on their ability to work.
And, in particular, in Mississippi, those risks are alarmingly high.
It’s 75 times more dangerous to give birth in Mississippi than it — than it is to have a pre-viability abortion, and those risks are disproportionately threatening the lives of women of color.
~Julie Rikelman
When counsel for The United States (The Biden Admin), an amici in this case (Amici’s are groups that are not part of the suit, but people with a vested interest in the suit, who join with the people filing suit) stepped up to the mic, Justice Thomas, seeming to be as troubled with Alito that Roe guaranteed a right that isn’t in the Constitution, point blank asked,
“What specifically is the right we’re talking about here?”
Counsel Prelogar responded:
Well, Justice Thomas, I think that the Court in those other contexts with respect to those other amendments has had to articulate what the text means and the bounds of the constitutional guarantees, and it’s done so through a variety of different tests that implement First Amendment rights, Second Amendment rights, Fourth Amendment rights. So I don’t think that there is anything unprecedented or anomalous about the right that the Court articulated in Roe and Casey and the way that it implemented that right by defining the scope of the liberty interest by reference to viability and providing that that is the moment when the balance of interests tips and when the state can act to prohibit a woman from getting an abortion based on its interest in protecting the fetal life at that point. It’s the right of a woman prior to viability to control whether to continue with the pregnancy.
~Elizabeth Prolegar
Counsel Prolegar was asked by Justice Kagan to talk about “reliance,” which Cornell defines as “A legal concept defining the dependence by one person on another person’s or entity’s statements or actions, particularly where the person acts upon such dependence.” Prolegar’s arguments spoke often of reliance as part of their argument, so Justice Kagan was presumably giving her an opportunity to elaborate on it.
Her response cut right to the bone:
Well, there are multiple reliance interests here, as I think Casey correctly recognized.
Casey pointed to the individual reliance of women and their partners who had been able to organize their lives and make important life decisions against the backdrop of having control over this incredibly consequential decision whether to have a child.
And people make decisions in reliance on having that kind of reproductive control, decisions about where to live, what relationships to enter into, what investments to make in their jobs and careers. And so I think, on a very individual level, there has been profound reliance.
And it’s certainly the case that not every woman in America has needed to exercise this right or has wanted to, but one in four American women have had an abortion, and for those women, the right secured by Roe and Casey has been critical in ensuring that they can control their bodies and control their lives. And then I think there’s a second dimension to it that Casey also properly recognized, and that’s the societal dimension. That’s the — the understanding of our society, even though this has been a controversial decision, that this is a liberty interest of women.
It’s the case that not everyone agrees with Roe versus Wade, but just about every person in America knows what this Court held, they know how the Court has defined this concept of liberty for women and what control they will have in the situation of an unplanned pregnancy. And for the Court to reverse course now, I think, would run counter to that societal reliance and the very concept we have of what equality is guaranteed to women in this country.
Much to the surprise of those of us who believe in the court being pragmatic, and adherent to stare decisis, the conservative majority did what Trump said they’d do, and overturned Roe v. Wade and Panned Parenthood v. Casey.
In his opinion, Alito went straight to hard-ass mode level expert, and argued that because abortion isn’t mentioned in the Constitution, SCOTUS had no business calling it a right out of thin air.
While I concede the Constitution doesn’t specifically mention abortion, it sure as fuck mentions the right to be secure in your person (4th amendment), and the right to life, liberty, and property in the 14th Amendment. SCOTUS makes decisions all day, where the text isn’t clear, tying the text, to what they believe the text’s intent is, or it’s logical conclusion. They make a shit ton of decisions, on the basis of constitutional merit, on things that aren’t specifically mentioned in the constitution, but that the constitution almost assuredly would have meant in a given scenario.
Being secure in one’s person, could and should easily include that government doesn’t own your own body, you do. And what you do to it, is your right. As such, the 4th amendment should confer your right to have a medical procedure done on yourself, including but not limited to, a fucking abortion. Although I suppose I can concede that maybe there’s some wiggle room for outlawing elective abortions, where the woman just doesn’t want to be pregnant, versus a prescribed abortion, where the doctor is suggesting it to save the mother’s life. But that’s an argument for another day, I suppose.
Being an Average Joe, and not a Harvard or Yale grad, I of course respect all nine justices, and disagree with Alito and company humbly. But three other people (the minority dissent) who are qualified agree with me, Alito’s reasoning is whack. He and the majority used confirmation bias to come to the conclusion they wanted on this issue, and that’s sad.
Hear oral arguments or read about the cases below.
log·i·cal: capable of reasoning or of using reason in an orderly cogent fashion lib·er·tar·i·an: an advocate of the doctrine of free will; a person who upholds the principles of individual liberty especially of thought and action
The Logical Libertarian™ 